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Schneider: Animals and Copyrights

WHY A MONKEY’S ACTION OF TAKING A SELFIE
SHOULD EXPAND THE DEFINITION OF AN
AUTHOR IN THE COPYRIGHT ACT
David Schneider*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2011, wildlife photographer David Slater set up a camera on
an island in Indonesia and hoped to capture a picture of the Celebes
Crested Macaque, an endangered monkey species indigenous to
Indonesia.1 Naruto, a six-year old Celebes Crested Macaque, came
upon Slater’s camera and took multiple pictures of himself.2 Naruto,
considered “highly intelligent,” familiarized himself with the operation
of the camera by observing humans who used the camera.3 Multiple
parties, including the parties who filed a lawsuit on Naruto’s behalf,
claimed copyright to one particular photograph, informally known as
the “Monkey Selfie.”4 Subsequently, the People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (hereinafter “PETA”) and Antje Engelhardt
filed a complaint against Slater in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California alleging that Slater infringed
Naruto’s copyright in the photograph.5 The court granted Slater’s

* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2019; Stony Brook
University, B.A. in United States History. Special Thanks: To Professor Jorge Roig for
overseeing and advising me on the topic. To Professor Rena Seplowitz for her constant
encouragement. To Joseph Tromba for his edits and assistance with this paper. To my family
for all the support they have given me. Finally, I dedicate this paper to all animals without a
voice or legal recourse that are constantly exploited.
1 Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2016), aff’d, 888 F.3d 418 (2018).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. Plaintiff alleged that Slater falsely claimed authorship of the photograph, and violated
the copyright by displaying, selling, and advertising copies of the photograph.

1349

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 [2018], Art. 20

1350

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

motion to dismiss because “the Copyright Act [did] not confer standing
upon animals like Naruto.”6
The Copyright Act (hereinafter “the Act”) does not specifically
define who is protected by copyright.7 Rather, the Act broadly states
that “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”8 Congress enacted the
Copyright Act of 1976 to preserve and promote artistic creations by
giving legal recourse to those whose work is copied and exploited.9
Although the Act does not specifically identify those entitled to
copyright protection, based on a combination of case law precedent
and the United States Copyright Office’s interpretation of the Act,
courts have refused to recognize that higher intelligence animals, such
as monkeys, can create original works of authorship fixed in tangible
media of expression, such as photographs.10
However, such
interpretation of the Act directly conflicts with Congress’s overall
intent when it implemented the copyright system in the United States.11
Animals can create new works of art, which should be
protected by copyright to prevent humans from exploiting them for
personal profit.12 Because of the combination of ever-increasing
public interest in protecting animals and their rights with scientific
discoveries based on the intelligence of animals, animals should be
afforded similar protections in copyright as humans.13 Courts should
expand the definition of “works of authorship” to include works
created by higher intelligence animals, such as monkeys, dolphins,
pigs, crows, raccoons, and elephants, who have demonstrated that they

6 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court’s reasoning
and affirmed the court’s decision. Naruto, 888 F.3d at 420.
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).
8 § 102. The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
9 See § 101.
10
Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *3.
11 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
12 See generally Jason G. Goldman, Creativity: The Weird and Wonderful Art of Animals,
BBC (July 24, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20140723-are-we-the-only-creativespecies.
13 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *4.
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can communicate with humans in some form or another and
understand human technology.14
Part II of this Note introduces the case Naruto v. Slater, which
PETA and Engelhardt brought in the Northern District of California on
behalf of Naruto. This Part also discusses the subsequent history of
the case, which includes an appeal and settlement. Part III examines
the Copyright Act of 1976 and analyzes Congress’s intent when it
enacted the statute. This Part also explains why courts should interpret
the statute to protect original works of authorship in animals. Part IV
argues that courts should disregard the Copyright Compendium’s
interpretation that an author needs to be a human being. Part V
discusses the Northern District of California’s flawed reasoning in
Naruto. Part VI discusses recommendations for courts to use in the
future when dealing with similar animal rights issues. Part VII
evaluates the Copyright Act and provides examples where the Act
itself provides protections for animals. Finally, Part VIII concludes
that animals should be permitted to bring copyright infringement
lawsuits because they can create original works of authorship.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

This section discusses the trial court’s decision in the Northern
District of California, the appeal brought by PETA on Naruto’s behalf,
and the settlement reached by the parties. The trial court denied Naruto
protection under the Copyright Act because it held that human beings
have standing under the Act, not animals. After an appeal by PETA,
the parties settled favorably for both sides. This section discusses the
court’s reasoning, the plaintiffs’ arguments, and how the parties settled
the case.
A.

Trial Court’s Decision in the Northern District of
California

In 2011, David Slater, a wildlife photographer, set up a camera
on a reserve on the island of Sulawesi, Indonesia, to capture a picture
of the endangered Celebes Crested Macaque species that are

14 Id. at *1; Leyre Castro & Ed Wasserman, Crows Understand Analogies: What Birds Can
Teach Us about Animal Intelligence, SCI. AM. (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican
.com/article/crows-understand-analogies/.
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indigenous to Indonesia.15 Naruto, a six-year old Celebes Crested
Macaque, came upon Slater’s camera and took multiple pictures of
himself.16 Multiple parties claimed copyright to one particular
photograph, which became informally known as the “Monkey Selfie,”
including parties representing the Celebes Crested Macaque.17 Naruto,
represented by PETA and Antje Engelhardt (Next Friends), brought a
copyright infringement claim against Slater and Blurb, Inc., the
company that published a book containing the Monkey Selfie.18 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated sections 106 and 501 of
the Copyright Act by displaying, advertising, and selling the Monkey
Selfie.19 The plaintiffs sought damages, in the form of profits from
previous uses of the Monkey Selfie, and an injunction to prevent the
defendants from any additional use of the selfie.20 Section 106 states
that “the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to
do and to authorize any of the following . . . to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phono records; . . . to distribute copies
or phono records of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending.”21 Section 501(a)
states:
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through
122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or
who imports copies or phonorecords into the United
States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the
copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.22
Section 501(b) provides that “[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an
exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action
for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she
is the owner of it.”23 Under these two sections, the plaintiffs asserted

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2016).
Id. § 501(a).
Id. § 501(b).
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that Naruto is the rightful copyright owner and, thus, Slater and Blurb,
Inc. infringed Naruto’s copyright.24
The court considered Naruto to be “highly intelligent,” and
familiar with people and tourists because of the location of his habitat
on the reserve.25 Naruto, at the time, was familiar with the way a
camera operates.26 He was also familiar with cameras because he had
previously observed humans using the camera.27 Through observation,
Naruto familiarized himself with the mechanisms of the camera and
developed a sense of trust towards humans.28 The trial court opined
that Naruto authored the selfie by “independent, autonomous action . .
. understanding the cause-and-effect relationship between pressing the
shutter release, the noise of the shutter, and the change of his reflection
in the camera lens.”29
Defendant moved to dismiss the claim, asserting that Naruto
lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution and
the Copyright Act of 1976.30 The trial court did not address the
constitutional issue of standing under Article III because it ruled that
Naruto lacked standing under the Copyright Act of 1976.31 However,
the trial court noted that in Cetacean Community v. Bush “[t]he Ninth
Circuit has stated that Article III ‘does not compel the conclusions that
a statutorily authorized suit in the name of an animal is not a “case or
controversy.”’”32 The Ninth Circuit stated that a reading of the text of
Article III of the United States Constitution does not explicitly limit
the ability to bring a claim in federal court solely to humans.33 Thus,
based on the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Article III, Naruto would
have standing under Article III of the Constitution.34
While Naruto may have standing under the Constitution, he
lacked standing under the Copyright Act based on the Ninth Circuit’s

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. (citing Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Id.
Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *2.
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ruling in Cetacean Community.35 The trial court rejected plaintiff’s
argument that the Copyright Act is available to anyone and ruled that
the Ninth Circuit had already ruled on this issue of animal standing
under the Copyright Act in Cetacean Community.36 The Ninth Circuit
analyzed the Copyright Act to determine whether animals have
standing under the Act, but it was unable to find congressional intent
regarding this issue.37 Since the Copyright Act did not explicitly state
animals could claim authorship, and previous courts’ rulings had
repeatedly referred to humans when determining authorship, the trial
court determined that animals did not have standing to bring a claim
under the Copyright Act.38 Finally, the trial court turned to the United
States Copyright Office Practices of 2014, known as the Copyright
Compendium, which specifically addressed the issue of human
authorship regarding the Copyright Act.39
Courts had previously looked to, and continue to look to, the
Compendium for guidance on issues that are ambiguous in the
copyright statutes.40 As taken from the manual, the purpose of the
Compendium was to serve as “the administrative manual of the
Register of Copyrights concerning Title 17 of the United States Code
and Chapter 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations.”41 The Copyright
Compendium “provides guidance to agency staff regarding their
statutory duties and provides expert guidance to applicants,
practitioners, scholars, the courts, and members of the general public
regarding institutional practices and related principles of law.”42 The
Compendium covers “the many technical requirements, regulations
and legal interpretations of the U.S. Copyright Office . . . [and]
provides guidance regarding the contents and scope of particular
registrations and records.”43 The Compendium states, “The U.S.
Copyright Office will register an original work of authorship, provided

35 Id. The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Cetacean Community was binding on the Northern
District of California when it decided Naruto.
36 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *2.
37 Id. at *3.
38 Id.
39
Id. at *4.
40 Id.
41 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 1 (3d ed. 2014), https://www.copy
right.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf.
42 Id.
43 Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss4/20

6

Schneider: Animals and Copyrights

2018

ANIMALS AND COPYRIGHTS

1355

that the work was created by a human being.”44 Further, the
Compendium states that works that humans did not create are not
copyrightable.45 Relying on the Compendium, the court granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss because Naruto lacked standing under
the Copyright Act.46 The court reasoned that his photograph was not
entitled to copyright because he was an animal.47 The court explained
that the issue of whether an animal has standing under the Copyright
Act should be left to Congress through legislation or the President,
presumably through executive order.48
B.

The Appeal and Settlement

The plaintiffs appealed the decision of the trial court,
challenging the decision that human authorship is required for standing
to bring a claim under the Copyright Act.49 However, the parties
reached a settlement agreement prior to a decision by the court and
requested that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismiss the
earlier decision stating that animals cannot own a copyright.50 Under
the settlement agreement, Slater agreed to donate approximately 25%
of any future revenue from the photo to groups that are dedicated to
protecting the macaques and their reserves in Indonesia.51 An
evaluation of the settlement agreement would suggest that the
settlement was more favorable to Naruto.52 This settlement agreement
should serve as a guide for future animal copyright cases.53 The

44

COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 4.
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 4.
46 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *4.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1 (No. 16-15469), 2016
WL 4089357, at *1.
50 Jason Slotkin, ‘Monkey Selfie’ Lawsuits Ends with Settlement Between PETA,
Photographer, NPR (Sept. 12, 2017, 1:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2017/09/12/550417823/-animal-rights-advocates-photographer-compromise-overownership-of-monkey-selfie. Despite the settlement, the Ninth Circuit answered the questions
anyway and affirmed the trial court. See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (2018).
51 Id.
52 Id. The article does not explicitly state that Naruto won the case, but the terms of the
settlement suggest that Naruto won in the end.
53 Id. The agreement reached between the parties seems to be a fair compromise to all
parties involved and should serve as a guideline for future cases. The settlement considers the
interest that would be most beneficial to Naruto and the species as a whole, and did not deprive
45
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settlement agreement seemingly provided animals with certain rights
that the courts generally have not enumerated. Further, both parties
apparently disagreed with the decision of the court to deny copyright
protection to the plaintiff. This settlement agreement provides a
perfect balance between fairness and logic. Animals do not intend to
create art because they do not understand the concept; however,
without human intervention, their art would never be seen by others
even though its creation may have been unintentional. Animals are not
known to put their “art” on display; thus, a human would be required
to put that “art” on display for the world to see. As such, this settlement
agreement provides both sides with fair compensation, because both
parties were involved in the creation and popularization of the image.
III.

UNDERSTANDING THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND WHY IT
SHOULD INCLUDE ANIMALS

Congress enacted the Copyright Act to protect “original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device.”54 The initial ownership clause of the Act states that a
“[c]opyright in a work . . . vests initially in the author or authors of the
work.”55 The Act does not define the term “author” or “authors,” but
the Supreme Court has previously defined the term “author” with
respect to copyrights.56
It is well established in the case law developed by the Supreme
Court that the determination of the author of a work protected by
copyright should be in the broadest terms possible.57 Under this
definition, Naruto, and thus animals in general, can be authors of
original expressions of work, because Naruto, as well as animals in
general, are capable of creating works of authorship fixed in tangible

Slater of all his income from the photo. Slater’s claim to the copyright was based on the facts
that the photograph was taken with his camera and Naruto is an animal.
54 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016).
55 Id. § 201(a).
56 See generally id. § 101. The definition of the word “author” is absent from the definition
section of the statute, but it is used throughout the section.
57 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). The case does not
specifically define what the Court meant by “broad” but it stated, “We entertain no doubt that
the constitution is broad enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far
as they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.” Id.
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media.58 Naruto, by explicitly stating that he is the author of the
photograph, has been declared the author of the Monkey Selfie.59
Thus, the only question that remains is whether the Act provides an
animal with copyright protection.60 Although the statute does not
provide whether an animal can be an author entitled to copyright
protection, the courts’ broad construction of author supports such an
interpretation.61
In 1884, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the
term “author,” in the context of copyright, should be interpreted as
broadly as possible.62 The Supreme Court was tasked with
determining whether the defendant, a photographer, infringed the
copyright of the plaintiff, a lithographer, regarding a photograph.63 In
Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, the Court reasoned that the
“‘author,’ ‘inventor,’ and ‘designer,’ as used in the art of photography
. . . mean the person who so produced the photograph.”64 The Court
elaborated that “[a]n author in that sense is ‘he to whom anything owes
its origin; originator; maker, one who completes a work of science or
literature.’”65 The Supreme Court in this case explicitly did not use the
word “human” or “person” to describe an author but instead used the
words “originator” and “maker.”66 As seen throughout the entire
opinion, the Supreme Court never made a reference to the fact that a
human is required.67 The Court used gender pronouns to describe
authors, but these gender pronouns can be applied to monkeys as well
as humans.68
In 1973, the Supreme Court affirmed this concept of a broad
interpretation of authorship in Goldstein v. California,69 by stating
“[w]hile an author may be viewed as an individual who writes an
original composition, the term, in its constitutional sense, has been

58

See generally id. The Supreme Court does not explicitly exclude animals from being
considered authors.
59 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.
60 Id. at *2.
61 See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 53.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 54.
64
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 55.
65 Id. at 57-58.
66 Id. at 58.
67 See generally id. at 53.
68 Id. at 58-60.
69 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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construed to mean an originator, he to whom anything owes its
origin.”70 In 1989, the Supreme Court once again affirmed its
expansive definition of the term “author” in Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid.71 The Supreme Court, quoting the Copyright
Act of 1976, stated that “ownership vests initially in the author or
authors of the work.”72 The Court also quoted the Copyright Act
stating, “[a]s a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates
the work.”73 The Court once again explicitly avoided using human and
instead defined authors as parties.74 This broad definition of
authorship, which the Supreme Court tends to favor, supports the the
argument that animals should be included in the broad definition.
Under the Copyright Act, Naruto, and all animals who create new
artistic expression, should have standing to survive a motion to dismiss
their claims based on lack of standing.75 Because the Supreme Court
did not explicitly exclude animals from being considered authors in its
decisions in Burrow-Giles and Goldstein, the Court demonstrated its
acceptance that humans should not be the only class of animals for
which their works of authorship can be protected by copyright.76
Courts interpret statutes and often turn to the legislative intent behind
statutes when a term is unclear from the plain language of the statute.77
The Supreme Court has long established the authority to
determine the legislative intent of Congress when a statute’s terms are
unclear.78 In one of the most important and defining cases of American
history, the Supreme Court ruled in Marbury v. Madison79 that the
Court has the authority to review laws passed by Congress to
determine if they conflict with the Constitution.80 In Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, the Supreme Court reasoned that
70

Id. at 562. Petitioners were charged with copying several musical performances from
commercially sold recordings without permission of the owner.
71 See generally Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
72 Id. at 735.
73 Id. at 737.
74 Id. at 736-37. While the Court was not contemplating animals in this decision, their word
choice suggests that they desired a broad definition of authorship.
75 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016). The Copyright Act does not explicitly state animals should have
rights to a copyright; however, it does not limit the reach of its protection to just humans. Id.
76
See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); see also
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
77 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 602-03 (2008).
78 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 179-80.
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“the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its
purpose are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative
intent.”81 This power, which has been upheld until the present day,82
was further expanded in District of Columbia v. Heller, in which the
Supreme Court ruled that in cases of ambiguity regarding
congressional and legislative intent, the Court may determine the intent
of the framers of the law or statute.83
The power of determining legislative intent has long been
vested in the powers of the court system.84 On multiple occasions, the
Court has had the opportunity to address this issue of whether a nonhuman can hold a copyright, but has declined every time.85 The lower
courts have also avoided addressing the issue of a non-human holding
a copyright. In particular, the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine
whether a copyright owner can bring an infringement claim for a book
consisting of revelations allegedly received from celestial beings.86
The court analyzed the issue of whether the Urantia Foundation could
be considered the copyright owner of a book called the Urantia Book,
which was compiled and collected by humans, but claimed to be
authored by celestial beings.87 The Urantia Foundation brought suit
against Kristen Maaherra, alleging that Maaherra infringed Urantia’s
copyright when she redistributed the Foundation’s book on disk.88
The district court ruled in favor of Maaherra because Urantia failed to
properly renew its copyright.89 On the renewal form, Urantia claimed
that the book fell under the “made for hire” provision of the Copyright
Act, which stated that the employer owns the copyright if made by an
employee during his employment.90 Essentially, Urantia was claiming
that the celestial being was an employee of the foundation.91 The court
granted Urantia’s claim for copyright protection and denied ruling on
the issue that the book was not “made for hire” because Urantia would
81

Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979).
The Supreme Court has not overturned Marbury v. Madison.
83 See generally Heller, 554 U.S. at 570.
84 See generally Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137. Marbury has been upheld since its ruling in 1804.
85 See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 53; see also Goldstein, 412
U.S. at 546; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).
86
See generally Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1997).
87 Id. at 956.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 957.
91 Urantia, 114 F.3d at 957.
82
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have succeeded on the merits even if such claim was false.92 Thus, the
court held that Urantia’s copyright claim was valid.93
More importantly, the Ninth Circuit addressed Maaherra’s
claim that Urantia did not have a valid copyright in the Urantia Book
because “it lacks the requisite ingredient of human creativity, and that
therefore the Book is not a ‘work of authorship’ within the meaning of
the Copyright Act.”94 The court stated that the copyright laws “do not
expressly require human authorship, and considerable controversy has
arisen in recent years over the copyrightability of computer-generated
work.”95 The court further stated that “at the very least, for a worldly
entity to be guilty of infringing a copyright, that entity must have
copied something created by another worldly entity.”96 The court in
this case recognized that authorship does not need to be human in order
to be protectable under the Copyright Act but must be a worldly entity,
a term which the court did not define.97 By analogy, a monkeygenerated artistic expression is similar to a computer-generated artistic
expression because both a computer and a monkey are worldly
entities.98 The court’s hesitation to declare that an animal, or in
general, a non-human, has no standing under the Copyright Act
showed, in part, that an animal can have standing.99 The lack of
making such a decision explicitly demonstrates that the court, which
had the power to determine congressional intent, did not fully agree
that the Copyright Act applies to only humans.100 If Congress intended
for humans to be the only entities whose works could be protected by
copyright, then it would have explicitly stated so in the statutes, or

92 Id. at 962-63. Made for hire work is work that is created by an employee as part of their
employment. Even if Urantia’s claim that the celestial being was an employee of the
foundation was false, the Court still would have ruled in their favor based on the merits of the
case.
93 Id. at 963.
94 Id. at 958.
95 Id.
96 Urantia, 114 F.3d at 958.
97 Id.
98 Entity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity (last
visited June 28, 2018). The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines entity as “being, existence;
especially; independent, separate, or self-contained existence. The existence of a thing as
contrasted with its attributes. Something that has a separate and distinct existence and
objective or conceptual reality.” Id.
99 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 1476 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659.
100 Id.
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courts would have expressly ruled so in accordance with congressional
intent when it enacted the Act.101
The courts have addressed a similar situation in which the
copyright owner is unable to make decisions, such as minors who, by
law, are deemed unable to make sound, legal decisions.102 The United
States District Court of Arizona analyzed the issue of whether a minor
could own a copyright.103 Barbara Mason was seventeen years old
when she authored her own song and composition.104 Although Mason
was a minor at the time that the copyright was granted, the court
concluded that she was the rightful owner of the copyright.105
In 2015, in I.C. ex rel Solovsky v. Delta Galil USA,106 the
Southern District of New York ruled that a minor could allege
copyright infringement of an original artistic expression.107 I.C.
submitted a design for a girl’s clothing brand for a contest that was
based on the originality of a design.108 I.C. won the contest but never
received any compensation based on her design.109 The court shed
light on the issue of when a copyright is denied by the U.S. Copyright
Office and the protections afforded to a denied copyright.110 The court
ruled that when the Copyright Office denies a copyright, there are two
possible courses of action.111 The denied party can seek to overturn
the Copyright Office’s denial or may proceed under the Copyright Act
§ 411(a), which allows reevaluation of validity.112 In this case, whether
the copyright was valid or not, protection was afforded to non-minors
and minors.113 This situation is analogous to animal copyrights
because, similar to minors, animals are unable to bring claims on their
See generally id. Artificial intelligence can be considered a “worldly entity” by
definition. An animal can also be considered to be a worldly entity and, therefore, able to hold
a copyright under this definition.
102 See generally Mason v. Jamie Music Publ’g Co., 658 F. Supp. 2d 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
103 Id. at 574-75.
104 Id. at 575.
105 Id. at 587.
106 135 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
107 Id. at 215.
108 Id. at 203.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 206.
111 Delta Galil, 135 F. Supp. 3d. at 213.
112 Id. Section 411(a) states that when registration is refused, the alleged owner is entitled
to institute a civil action for infringement. The Register may become a party to the action with
respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2016).
113 See generally Delta Galil, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 196. The court ruled on the basis of unjust
enrichment.
101

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 [2018], Art. 20

1362

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

own without assistance of a non-minor.114 Minors and animals share
many similar characteristics regarding copyrights.115 Minors and
animals both have the capabilities of creating original works of artistic
expression, both require an adult human being to bring suit on their
behalf, and both classes are worldly entities.116 Based on these
similarities, animals should be afforded the same copyright protections
as minors.117
IV.

THE COURTS SHOULD DISREGARD THE COMPENDIUM’S
INTERPRETATION THAT AN AUTHOR NEEDS TO BE HUMAN

The Copyright Compendium is not the governing law when
determining the eligibility of a worldly entity to hold a copyright. As
previously stated, the Copyright Compendium is released by the
United States Copyright Office to provide legal guidance regarding
copyright law and related copyright matters.118 In the “Standard of
Deference” section of the Compendium, the drafters admit that “the
Compendium does not override any existing statute or regulation.”119
The drafters recognized that the “policies and practices set forth in the
Compendium do not in themselves have the force and effect of law and
are not binding upon the Register of the Copyrights or U.S. Copyright
Office staff.”120 The Compendium states that “[t]he Supreme Court
recognized that courts may consider the interpretations set forth in
administrative manuals, policy statements, and similar materials to the
extent that those interpretations have the power to persuade.”121
Finally, the drafters state “[t]he weight of the agency’s judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier

114

Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1. As discussed, this suit was brought on Naruto’s behalf
by PETA and Engelhardt.
115 See generally Mason v. Jamie Music Publ’g Co., 658 F. Supp. 2d 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
116 See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(1)(A)-(D) (stating “The following representatives may sue or
defend on behalf of a minor or an incompetent person: (A) a general guardian; (B) a
committee; (C) a conservator; or (D) a like fiduciary”).
117 Both minors and animals require a guardian because they lack the basic competency
needed to initiate a lawsuit.
118 See discussion of the Copyright Compendium supra Part I.
119 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2.
120 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2.
121 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2 (citing
Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000)).
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and later pronouncements, and all those factors to which it gives power
to persuade.”122
The Compendium lists numerous copyright cases where the
courts have given the Compendium deference.123 The cases listed
range from disclaiming preexisting works, registration requirements
for databases, registration requirements for collective works, and
publication regulation.124 The Compendium cites to the Southern
District of Texas court’s view in the case Rogers v. Better Business
Bureau of Metropolitan Houston, Inc.125 Citing to this case, the
Compendium states that “policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines do not carry the force of law but they are
entitled to some deference given the specialized experience and
broader investigations and information of the agency.”126 In this
section, courts give great weight to the Compendium for registration
requirements, but courts have not cited to any case law in which the
Compendium has been used to determine legislative intent.127
Congress enacts each statute with a specific legislative intent, and it is
up to the courts to interpret Congress’s intent when a statute is
unclear.128
The U.S. Copyright Office exceeded its administrative power
by interpreting the legislative intent of the Copyright Act, which
should have been left to the courts.129 The power to determine statutory
interpretation has already been conferred on the judicial branch of the
United States in Marbury.130 In Marbury, Justice Marshall stated that
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is.”131 The power of legislative interpretation lies
within the judicial branch, but the Compendium has weakened the
power of the courts by improperly interpreting statutes as an

122

COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2.
See COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2.
124 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2.
125 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2 (citing 887 F.
Supp. 2d 722, 732 (S.D. Tex. 2012)).
126 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2 (quoting
Rogers, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 732).
127 See generally COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2.
128 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
129 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).
130 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-78.
131 Id. at 177.
123
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administrative entity as opposed to a judicial entity.132 The Supreme
Court has given some weight to administrative statutory interpretation,
but only pertaining to cases of ambiguity.133
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
134
Inc., the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the “EPA’s
decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices
within the same industrial grouping . . . is based on a reasonable
construction of the statutory term ‘stationary source.’”135 The Court
ruled that “[w]hen Congress has explicitly left a gap for an agency to
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”136 The
Court further ruled that “any ensuing regulation is binding on the
courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”137 The courts have
“long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer.”138 The Court reasoned that
it can still be apparent from the agency’s general
conferred authority and other statutory circumstances
that Congress would expect the agency to be able to
speak with force of law when it addresses ambiguity in
the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one
about one which Congress did not actually have an
intent as to a particular result.139
Because the statute is not ambiguous, the court in Naruto
improperly deferred to the agency’s determination on the issue of
whether an animal can own a copyright.140 As stated previously, the
132 See generally id. at 137. Despite the Court’s clear ruling that the power to determine
legislative intent lies within the judiciary, the Copyright Office improperly seeks to interpret
legislative intent in the Compendium.
133 City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 304-05 (2013).
134 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
135 Id. at 840.
136 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84344.)
137
Id.
138 Id. at 227-28.
139 Id. at 229.
140 See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). Author
should be defined as broadly as possible. Id. Since the term author should be defined as
broadly as possible, there should not be any ambiguity and the term should include all authors.
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Supreme Court has determined in Burrow-Giles Lithographic that the
term “author” should be interpreted as broadly as possible; thus, it is
clear that the Supreme Court has already determined who an author is
under the Copyright Act.141 The Court specifically limited the power
of the U.S. Copyright Office to interpret a statute or regulation if it is
ambiguous.142 This determination was further developed in 2013.143
In City of Arlington v. F.C.C., the Supreme Court was asked to
determine “whether an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity
that concerns the scope of its regulatory authority is entitled to
deference under Chevron.”144 The Court ruled that “if the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute, that is the
end of the matter.”145 The Court explained that statutory interpretation
should only be evaluated by an agency if congressional intent is
unclear.146 It is clear that Congress has repeatedly refused to define
“author” since the enactment of the statute.147 Consequently, courts,
like the Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic, have not explicitly held
that “author” under the Copyright Act covers humans only.148
Therefore, there is no ambiguity present that would trigger a need for
an agency to interpret the statute under Chevron. Because the agency
lacked the authority to interpret the statute, courts should interpret the
term “author” as broadly as possible, which would protect Naruto’s
copyright in the Monkey Selfie.149
The House of Representatives intended for the definition of
author to remain broad when it reviewed the original Copyright Act of
1909 for amendments in 1976.150 The purpose of this review was to
provide for general revisions of the United States copyright laws.151 In
the sectional analysis and discussion, the House of Representatives
addressed section 102, which provides for the general subject matter

141 Id. Because the Court used the term as “broadly” as possible, it should be read to include
every worldly entity, including animals.
142 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)
143 See generally City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 290 (2013).
144 Id. at 293.
145 Id. at 307.
146 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
147
See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 53. Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. has not been overturned since its ruling.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
151 Id. at 47.
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of copyright, more specifically, original works of authorship.152 The
House intentionally left the phrase “original works of authorship”
undefined to incorporate, without change, the standard originally
established by the courts under the previous statute.153 The standard of
originality did not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or
esthetic merit, and there was no intention to change the standard to
require more.154 The House further expressed that copyright law has
been one of “gradual expansion” for new types of works that are
afforded protection under the Act.155 The House stated that “the bill
does not intend to either freeze the scope of copyrightable subject
matter at the present stage of communication technology or to allow
unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present
congressional intent.”156 The scope of the bill is to protect all original
works of authorship, and not to exclude any potential author from
obtaining a copyright. The House ended this section stating that
although the coverage is very broad in its present state, “there are
unquestionably other areas of existing subject matter that this bill does
not propose to protect but that future Congresses may want to.”157
Throughout the entire House Committee Notes, the House
never used words “human” or “animal.”158 As previously stated, the
purpose was to make amendments to the Copyright Act to clarify
certain terms; however, the House purposefully and specifically did
not clarify that an author must be a human.159 Therefore, the House
seemingly left the term undefined to incorporate any possible author,
including animals.160 If Congress intended for humans to be the only
authors protected under the Copyright Act, it had ample opportunity to
amend or clarify its position. Instead, it has demonstrated its intent
that the term author be left undefined to encompass all animals.

152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51.
Id.
Id. at 52.
See generally id.
Id. at 47.
See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476.
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DISCRETION BY
FOLLOWING THE RULING IN CETACEAN COMMUNITY V. BUSH

In Naruto, the trial court relied on the decision in the Ninth
Circuit case Cetacean Community v. Bush.161 The court refused to
address the merits of the statutory violations because Naruto first
needed to establish standing.162 The court claimed that Congress had
not granted Naruto statutory standing because Cetacean Community
ruled that animals do not have standing under the Copyright Act.163
The judge erred in his decision because he mistakenly relied on the
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Cetacean Community, which involved
statutes that specifically required a human petitioner.164
Cetacean Community was decided on October 20, 2004 by the
Ninth Circuit.165 The sole plaintiff in this case was a self-appointed
attorney representing all of the world’s whales, porpoises, and
dolphins.166 The plaintiff alleged that the Navy had violated or would
violate the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection
Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act.167 The court ruled “it
is obvious that an animal cannot function as a plaintiff in the same
manner as a juridically competent human being.”168 The court
followed with “[b]ut we see no reason why Article III prevents
Congress from authorizing a suit in the name of an animal.”169 The
court compared animals to the likes of “infants, juveniles, and mental
incompetents.”170 The court then went through each of the alleged
statutes that the plaintiff claimed the Navy violated.171
The court denied the plaintiff’s standing under the Endangered
Species Act because the citizen-standing provision stated “any person
may commence a civil suit on his own behalf.”172 The plaintiff in this
matter was a human, but was not commencing the suit on his own
161

Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2016), aff’d, 888 F.3d 418 (2018).
162 Id. at *2-3.
163 Id. at *3.
164 Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2004).
165 See generally id.
166 Id. at 1171.
167
Id. at 1171-72.
168 Id. at 1176.
169 Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 1176-78.
172 Id. at 1177.
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behalf.173 The court then denied that the plaintiff had standing under
the Administrative Procedure Act because section 10(a) of the statute
required that the claim be brought by “[a] person suffering legal
wrong.”174 The court finally denied that the plaintiff had standing
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act because the statute
permitted “judicial review to any permit application, and to a ‘party’
opposed to such a permit.”175 When analyzing standing under the
National Environmental Policy Act, the court deferred to the APA for
its standing provisions because the statute lacked a provision regarding
enforcement.176 The court had already determined that the plaintiff
lacked standing under the APA, so it held the same way under the
National Environmental Policy Act.177 The court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that it had standing to bring the suit as an
association under the APA because the Cetaceans failed to establish
first-party organizational standing.178
The court concluded that “if Congress and the President
intended to take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as well
as people and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said so
plainly.”179 This conclusion by the court fails for one reason.180
Because Congress and the President did not plainly and explicitly state
that animals lacked standing, they did not intend to limit the ability of
animals to have standing.181 In fact, had Congress and the President
intended to limit standing to persons only, they could have easily
followed the language of the Endangered Species Act, which
specifically limited standing to persons only.182
Although Cetacean Community and Naruto both involved
standing for animals that bring lawsuits, the facts of Naruto differ in
such a way that Cetacean Community should not have been the basis
for the trial court’s decision.183 First, Naruto is one Silver Crested
173

Id.
Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176.
175 Id. at 1178.
176 Id. at 1176-77.
177 Id. at 1179.
178 Id. First-party organizational standing is a form of association standing, which gives
people standing to sue for another if they would have had the right to sue themselves.
179
Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1179.
180 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476.
181 See generally id.
182 See generally Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d 1169. Each of the acts contains provisions that
specifically limit standing to humans. Id.
183 Compare Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1, with Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1169.
174
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Macaque, whereas the plaintiff in Cetacean Community sought to
represent the entire world’s population of a species of animals with
which he did not have a direct connection.184 In Naruto, the plaintiff
had a personal connection with the monkey and sought to protect his
rights only.185 Antje Englehardt personally knew and interacted with
Naruto for Naruto’s entire life.186 PETA was an organization that
promoted the ethical treatment of animals in four specific industries,
one of which was the entertainment industry.187 Both parties that sued
on behalf of Naruto were involved with animal protection and,
specifically, with Naruto’s protection.188
The court in Cetacean Community relied on the words of the
statutes to deny the plaintiff in the case standing under the violated
acts.189 The language of the Copyright Act does not limit statutory
standing to just persons but instead expands it to all “authors.”190 The
court in Naruto, citing the court in Cetacean Community, stated
“Congress must make its intentions clear before the courts will
construe a statute to confer standing on a particular plaintiff.”191
Congress’s intention was clear in that it did not specifically deny
standing to animals, thereby giving animals standing to bring lawsuits
under the Copyright Act.192 However, the court in Naruto followed
Cetacean Community and held that “the Copyright Act does not plainly
extend the concept of authorship or statutory standing to animals.”193
In fact, the statute does not plainly confer the right to humans either,
as the Ninth Circuit observed when it noted that the drafters of the
statute intentionally left the term “author” and “works of authorship”
“undefined to provide for some flexibility.”194 If courts were to follow
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Cetacean Community, no person or animal
would have standing because Congress has not plainly conferred the
protection to either party according to the plain meaning of the

184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1; Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1171.
Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 49, at *7.
About PETA, PETA, https://www.peta.org/about-peta/ (last visited June 28, 2018).
Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).
Id.
Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *2 (citing Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d 1169).
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).
Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *2.
Id.
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statute.195 This notion does not make sense because people do have
protection, which exemplifies the court’s flawed reasoning in
Cetacean Community.
The judge in Naruto failed to properly evaluate the ruling in
Cetacean Community and distinguish the facts in that case from the
facts in Naruto.196 In Cetacean Community, the actual language of the
acts stated that a person is required for standing to be granted.197 The
plain language of the Copyright Act does not limit standing to just
humans.198 Instead, the court relied on the Compendium, which is
persuasive at best, and not binding.199
Rather than following the flawed reasoning of the court in
Cetacean Community, the court in Naruto should have followed the
ruling in Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez.200 In this case, agencies
representing the interest of the endangered right whale brought suit
against the United States Department of Commerce seeking to reduce
boat traffic in certain areas.201 Right whales were endangered due to
over hunting and were protected by the United States government.202
Heavy shipping traffic infiltrated the natural critical habitats for the
right whales identified by the National Marine Fisheries Services.203
Shipping traffic was the number one cause of right whale mortality and
was causing the species to become extinct.204 The Defenders of
Wildlife sued the Coast Guard, which was responsible for protecting
the habitats of the right whales, for violation of the act that protected
the endangered right whale.205 Specifically, the Coast Guard was
accused of failing to consult with the Secretary of Commerce on
effective means to protect the remaining population, and the Coast
Guard failed to carry out programs that were designed to conserve the
right whale population.206 Plaintiffs were granted standing on the basis

195

Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1179.
See generally Naruto, 2016 WL 362231. The Court did not look at the standing required
for each claim. Id.
197 Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176-78.
198 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).
199 See generally COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41.
200 Defs. of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
201
Id. at 914.
202 Id. at 914-15.
203 Id. at 915.
204 Id.
205 Defs. of Wildlife, 532 F.3d. at 914.
206 Id. at 917.
196
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of causation and redressability.207 They successfully argued that the
Coast Guard had the authority to take into account right whales when
devising shipping traffic schemes, and thus a district court order could
redress the plaintiff’s injury.208
The injury in Naruto was the exploitation of Naruto’s original
work of art.209 Similar to Defenders of Wildlife, the court should have
found that the claim brought on behalf of Naruto satisfied all three
elements of standing.210 The causation of the injury was clearly from
Slater and Blurb, Inc.’s publishing Naruto’s work of art without his
permission.211 Courts could have easily resolved the issue of
redressability by granting Naruto copyright protection of his work of
art.212
VI.

FUTURE COURTS SHOULD LOOK TOWARDS THE
UNDERLYING MESSAGES CONVEYED IN THE SETTLEMENT
REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES

On September 11, 2017, Slater and PETA reached a settlement
agreement which ended the lawsuit filed on Naruto’s behalf.213 The
settlement included three aspects.214 First, Slater agreed to donate
twenty-five percent of future revenue from the photos to groups that
protect crested macaques and their habitat.215 Second, both parties
appealed to the Ninth Circuit to dismiss its decision in Cetacean
Community that animals cannot own a copyright.216 The third aspect
of the settlement was not released to the public.217
This settlement agreement is important for many reasons.218
First, both parties agreed, in the end, that Naruto was entitled to a share
207

Id. at 924-25.
Id. at 917.
209 See generally Naruto, 2016 WL 362231. Defendant is profiting from the labor of the
plaintiff without consent. Id.
210 Defs. of Wildlife, 532 F.3d at 923. Standing requirements are injury in fact, causation,
and redressability. Id.
211 See generally Naruto, 2016 WL 362231.
212 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1. Plaintiffs only sought to protect Naruto’s copyright;
therefore, this injury could have been redressed by granting him the protection he deserved.
213
Slotkin, supra note 50.
214 Slotkin, supra note 50.
215 Slotkin, supra note 50.
216 Slotkin, supra note 50.
217 Slotkin, supra note 50.
218 Slotkin, supra note 50.
208

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 [2018], Art. 20

1372

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

of the revenue.219 Second, both parties agreed that animals should have
the ability to own a copyright.220 This settlement exemplifies the
parties’ acceptance that an animal can own a copyright. A settlement
of the same structure could be adopted to be used in mediation,
arbitration, and litigation. If courts, the legislature, and the
administrative agencies refuse to identify animals as parties that can
seek copyright protection, this settlement structure can be offered as a
model, and hence a workaround, to prevent the exploitation of animals
while limiting the liability of humans.221 Unfortunately, the Ninth
Circuit does not share this same sentiment.
On April 23, 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmatively ruled against
Naruto.222 The Court determined that Naruto does not have standing
under the Copyright Act for various reasons. First, several provisions
of the Copyright Act persuaded the court “that animals [do not] have
statutory standing to sue under the Copyright Act.”223 Second, the
court reasoned that the use of the words “‘children’, ‘grandchildren’,
‘legitimate’, ‘widow’ and ‘widower’ all imply humanity and
necessarily exclude animals that do not marry and do not have heirs
entitled to property by law.”224 This reasoning by the Ninth Circuit is
overly narrow, as animals can have children, grandchildren, and have
been known to mate for life.225 The court held that the “district court
did not err in concluding that Naruto—and, more broadly, animals
other than humans—lack statutory standing to sue under the Copyright
Act.”226
VII.

THE COPYRIGHT ACT PROVIDES A WAY FOR REGISTRATION
OF A COPYRIGHT FOR AN ANIMAL

The Copyright Act includes a provision for unknown or
anonymous authors of a work.227 Section 409 of the Copyright Act

219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

Slotkin, supra note 50.
Slotkin, supra note 50.
Slotkin, supra note 50.
Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 426.
Id.
Penguins have been known to mate for life, which is significantly similar to marriage.
Naruto, 888 F.3d at 426.
17 U.S.C. § 409 (2016).
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describes the requirements for the application for copyright
registration.228 This section states:
The application for copyright registration shall be made
on a form prescribed by the Register of Copyrights and
shall include:
(1) the name and address of the copyright claimant;
(2) in the case of a work other than an anonymous or
pseudonymous work, the name and nationality or
domicile of the author or authors, and, if one or more of
the authors is dead, the dates of their death;
(3) if the work is anonymous or pseudonymous, the
nationality or domicile of the author or authors;
(4) in the case of a work made for hire, a statement to
this effect;
(5) if the copyright claimant is not the author, a brief
statement of how the claimant obtained ownership of
the copyright;
(6) the title of the work, together with any previous or
alternative titles under which the work can be
identified;
(7) the year in which creation of the work was
completed.229
Specifically, subsections 2 and 3 provide ways for registration
for works of art that are anonymous as long as the nationality or the
domicile of the author is provided.230 Further, a person close to Naruto
could file on his behalf under subsection 5 by claiming it is filing on
behalf of the original owner who wishes to remain anonymous.231 All
the other information such as the year of creation and title of the
creation are known to the parties.232 The Copyright Act protects
registration of works by anonymous authors. Therefore, Naruto should
have been granted a copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 409 (2) and (3).233

228
229
230
231
232
233

Id.
§ 409(1)-(7).
§ 409(2)-(3).
§ 409(5).
§ 409.
Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Should an animal, regardless of its intelligence, be afforded the
same copyright protections as those conferred on a human? The
Copyright Act does not explicitly exclude an animal from being
considered an author.234 The Supreme Court has had many
opportunities to limit the definition of “author” to humans only, but it
has consistently refused to limit the definition.235 Furthermore, the
House of Representatives specifically stated that it left the term
“author” undefined to broadly encompass all. Why should a court
reject an animal’s ability to own a copyright if Congress itself has not
expressly denied such a right? The simple, logical, and just answer is
that courts should not deny such protection to animals.
There are complexities when deciding the proper remedies for
an animal whose copyright has been violated.236 Animals can be
analogized to minors based on their incompetency, and the animal’s
rights could be protected in a similar manner to a minor’s rights by a
court-appointed guardian for the animal. A court would have to
appoint a guardian, but generally speaking, the guardian could be the
party that moved to defend the animal’s rights. The settlement reached
by the parties in Naruto237 may reflect a societal sentiment that animals
should have copyright protection of their works of art. Courts could
grant animals partial compensation to be used either for the animals’
benefit or for the benefit of the entire species. There is no reason why
an animal, regardless of its intelligence, should not be granted the same
protection afforded to a human. As such, Naruto deserved the
protection that it received in the settlement, and the courts and the
legislatures should explicitly recognize the validity of such protection.
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See generally id. § 101.
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41.
236 While animals and humans are similar, animals cannot manage their money. Most
animals do not have a need for money, a common remedy in a lawsuit. The money they do
win can be used to benefit their species, but still requires a person to handle its management
of that money.
237 Slotkin, supra note 50.
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